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John T. Reed' answers to Whitney' 2nd and 3rd lawsuits against him and countersuits against Whitney 2 84. Plaintiffs are libelproof as evidenced by, but not limited to, the following: "¢ Russ Whitney was convicted of second degree robbery and served a prison term for that crime from 1974 to 1976. "¢ In 1980, Russ Whitney was charged by police with leaving the scene of a personal-injury accident (hit and run). "¢ In that 1980 incident, he hit and severely injured a pedestrian with his truck, then left the scene without reporting the accident. The pedestrian' family sued and won a $1.2 million judgment against Whitney. "¢' Upon information and belief, Whitney avoided paying the majority of that judgment by threatening to declare bankruptcy. At that time"”1988"”he had been publicly claiming for years to have become "a millionaire" or to "have made a fortune" when he was 27, which was 1982. "¢ From 1990 to 1993, Russ Whitney had an extramarital affair with a subordinate. She gave birth to his child on May 14, 1994. He denied paternity and refused to pay child support. A DNA test proved he was the father and he was ordered to pay child support on June 19, 1997 (Lee County, Florida Case #95-009059CA). Although he had been claiming great financial success and personal wealth publicly as part of his efforts to sell his various get-rich-quick products and services, he told the court he was unable to pay much child support or other costs of the paternity suit. He succeeded in getting the child support amount down to $800 a month. "¢' Whitney companies have long had an unsatisfactory rating from the Better Business Bureau for refunds not paid and misrepresentations in sales pitches. "¢ On January 15, 1991, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor Protection issued a Notice to Cease and Desist and Notice of Intent to revoke installment sellers license (Proceeding 1450-F-7/89) against Russ Whitney and others. The proceeding accused Whitney and his company of numerous infractions including but not limited to misrepresentations, omissions of material facts, selling unregistered securities, selling securities through unlicensed dealers, failure to respond to a subpoena, and making false statements to the Florida Department of Banking and Finance. "¢ On March 5, 1997 Whitney company agreed to settle a suit against it by the State of Tennessee which accused Whitney of unfair or deceptive acts or practices. "¢ On June 2, 1998, the Michigan Attorney General gave a Whitney company ten days notice to cease and desist from engaging in certain unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods in the conduct of trade or commerce. Approximately nine years previously, on December 5, 1989, another Whitney company had entered into an agreement to stop selling business opportunities in that state. "¢' On July 9, 1999 the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania publicly accused Whitney company of presenting a misleading seminar and violating Pennsylvania' Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. 85. Defendant offers no services and therefore is not in competition with Plaintiff regarding the sale of services. 86. Any adverse effect on plaintiffs" business caused by information at defendant' Web site stems from the underlying behavior of plaintiffs reported accurately by defendant and not from any unlawful behavior by defendant. 87. Plaintiffs harmed themselves by causing a Fort Myers News-Press reporter to publish in that newspaper on November 4, 2003 the allegedly libelous phrases quoted in paragraph 18 of the amended complaint. 88. Plaintiffs did not mitigate their damages by promptly and publicly refuting alleged inaccuracies in statements at Reed' Web site. 89. All of defendant' actions have been lawful, justified, and

without malice. 90. If any statement of fact based on the public record regarding plaintiffs at defendant' Web site is false, it is because information supplied by plaintiffs to the government agencies or to readers of its public statements were inaccurate or incomplete or were rendered inaccurate or incomplete by the error of the agency in question or other third party publisher of said information. 91. The statements about plaintiffs at defendant' Web site are protected fair and substantially accurate reports of official government documents including Securities and Exchange Commission records and the United States Code, as well as other public documents including the writings of plaintiff WHITNEY. 92. To the extent that plaintiffs" complaint relates to rankings of defendant' WHITNEY- and WIN-related Web pages in Internet search engines like Google, the designers and operators of those search engines are solely responsible. Defendant has no interest in any search engine nor is he privy to the secret, proprietary formulae and procedures that govern their operations. Defendant had no control over the editing policies of Google or any other Internet search engine. 93. Plaintiffs" complaint for tortious interference with a business relationship is barred by Florida' single publication/single action rule. Plaintiffs may not prevent defendant from asserting valid defenses to public figure-media defamation claims by recasting the same facts into multiple causes of action all meant to seek compensation for the same harm. 94. The gravamen of paragraphs 6 through 17 of plaintiffs" amended complaint is trademark infringement and unfair competition notwithstanding plaintiffs" recharacterization of it as tortious interference with a business relationship. Indeed, plaintiffs originally filed the same complaint based on the same facts against the same defendant as trademark and unfair competition claims in the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division, on June 25, 2002. That complaint was dismissed by the court on May 5, 2003. 95. Plaintiffs abandoned their applications for registered marks on "RUSS WHITNEY" and "WHITNEY" and therefore have no statutory rights in them. 96. Plaintiffs" complaints about unspecified defamatory statements published by defendant are barred by the pertinent statute of limitations. 97. Plaintiffs" attempts to revive their application for registered marks are null and void because they have falsely represented to the United States Patent and Trademark Office that plaintiff Whitney Information Network, Inc. is a Florida corporation when, in fact, it is a Colorado corporation, thereby rendering any registered mark registration that might be issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office null and void and of no effect. 98. Plaintiffs" trademark and unfair competition claims are barred by the doctrines of laches, waiver, and equitable estoppel. 99. Even if defendant should be found to be infringing the mark of plaintiffs, no profits or other damages could be recovered by plaintiffs. Neither the words nor the abbreviations nor the symbols specified by 15 U.S.C.A. '§1111 for indicating the registration of a service mark were displayed with plaintiffs" marks as used on by them on their books or other literature or at their Web site. 100. The word "WHITNEY" is in common use and is public property being used as the name of a mountain, lake, museums, pop singer, and cotton gin, among other uses. In addition, the term "WHITNEY" has not acquired any secondary meaning in distinguishing plaintiffs" goods or services. 101. Plaintiffs" trademark and unfair competition claims are barred by the doctrines of fair use and permitted commentary under the Lanham Act, the common law, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 102. Defendant' use of plaintiffs" marks is non-confusing and nominative. 103. The statements that plaintiffs allege are defamatory were already in circulation prior to publication by defendant. COUNTERCLAIMS COUNT I"”VIOLATION OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATTER CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 15 USC 1125(d) 104. This is an action for injunctive and other relief under the Federal Anticybersquatter Consumer Protection Act, 15 USC 1125(d). 105. This Court has jurisdiction over this claim because it involves a federal question. 106. On May 22, 2003 counterdefendants Whitney Information Network, Inc. (hereinafter WIN) and Russ Whitney (hereinafter WHITNEY) registered the domain name https://www.whitney-facts-vs-johntreed.com. The Web site contains material created by counterdefendants and claims to be a refutation of the contents of counterplaintiff' Web site statements regarding WHITNEY and WIN. As such, this counterclaim is logically related to the defamation and tortious interference claims of WHITNEY and WIN against REED. 107. That domain name contains the personal name of counterplaintiff John T. Reed (hereinafter REED) which is protected as a mark under 15 USC 1125. The domain name https://www.whitney-facts-vs-johntreed.com also contains the entire domain name of REED (johntreed.com) which was registered by REED on June 12, 1996. This use of REED' personal name and domain name is likely to confuse the public as to the true origin of the Web site in question. 108. Without regard to the goods of REED, WHITNEY and WIN with bad faith intent to profit from REED' mark, registered, trafficked in, and used the https://www.whitney-facts-vs-johntreed.com domain name in violation of 15 USC 1125 (d), the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. 109. The https://www.whitney-facts-vs-johntreed.com domain name was distinctive at the time of its registration and is identical or confusingly similar to REED' marks. 110. Counterdefendants" aforesaid acts have caused and, upon information and belief, will continue to cause irreparable injury to counterplaintiff, and, unless they are restrained by this Court, they will be continued and counterplaintiff will continue to suffer irreparable injury. 111. Counterplaintiff has no adequate remedy at law COUNT II"”COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION 112. This is an action for injunctive and other relief for common law unfair competition. 113. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction. 114. Counterplaintiff incorporates herein each and every allegation set forth in Paragraphs 106 through 109 as if fully set forth herein. 115. Counterdefendants" aforesaid acts constitute infringement, misappropriation, and misuse of counterplaintiff' marks, unfair competition, palming off and passing off against counterplaintiff, and unjust enrichment of counterdefendants, all in violation of counterplaintiff' rights at common law. 116. Counterdefendants" aforesaid acts have caused and will continue to cause irreparable injury to counterplaintiff, and, unless they are restrained by this Court, they will be continued and counterplaintiff will continue to suffer irreparable injury. 117. Counterplaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. COUNT III"”FEDERAL TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 15 USC 1125 118. This is an action for injunctive and other relief for infringement of counterplaintiff' rights under 15 USC 1125 and, upon information and belief, counterdefendants" use of REED' marks is intentional and willful. 119. This Court has jurisdiction over this action because it is a federal question. 120. Counterplaintiff incorporates herein each and every allegation set forth in Paragraphs 106 through 109 as if fully set forth herein. 121. With full knowledge and awareness of counterplaintiff' ownership and prior use of the johntreed and johntreed.com marks, counterdefendants have intentionally used in commerce, and, upon information and belief, will continue to use the marks, which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive consumers and the public at large. 122. Counterdefendants" aforesaid acts constitute infringement, misappropriation, and misuse of counterplaintiff' marks, unfair competition, palming off and passing off against counterplaintiff, and unjust enrichment of counterdefendants, all in violation of counterplaintiff' rights at common law. 123. Counterdefendants" aforesaid acts have caused and will continue to cause irreparable injury to counterplaintiff, and, unless they are restrained by this Court, they will be continued and counterplaintiff will continue to suffer irreparable injury. 124. Counterplaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. COUNT IV"”ABUSE OF PROCESS 125. This is an action for damages under the common law of abuse of process. 126. This court has jurisdiction over this action under the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction. 127. Counterdefendants" willfully filed these two complaints and related documents for the improper purposes of harassing and intimidating counterplaintiff. 128. On September 27, 2001, counterdefendant Russ Whitney revealed his policy of improper use of the courts when he sent the following email Terry Vaughn who is the operator of a widely used Internet discussion group called Creative Real Estate on Line (CREONLINE): "Terry, I have been gentlemanly and patient with you. You obviously are not a man of your word. If that is not true then I will see ALL POSTS regarding me and my company immediately removed from your site AND YOUR ARCHIVES. Terry, if that is not done immediately, starting TODAY, prepare to spend some money. I will institute a lawsuit against Creonline, you and all Creonline employees. I will also sue every poster on your board that has slandered my good name, in FEDERAL COURT on Monday morning. Count on it! Monday morning. Federal Court. Win or lose, you WILL be spend money from here on out for the illegal and slanderous use of my name." [Emphasis in original] 129. Case number 03-60195 was originally filed by counterdefendants in Broward County Circuit Court on January 29, 2003. That suit could have and should have been filed, if at all, by amending the then existing complaint by the same counterdefendants against the same counterplaintiff based on the same facts in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Fort Myers (Case #2:02-cv-288-FTM-29DNF). Counterdefendants filed the case in Broward County Circuit Court in order to force counterplaintiff to travel to two different Florida cities and to make it difficult for the pro se counterplaintiff who lives in California to comply with pertinent procedure and research pertinent law. 130. On February 12, 2003, counterplaintiff filed a notice of removal in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the case was assigned to the Fort Lauderdale Division and assigned case number 03-60195-CIV-MARRA/SELTZER. Defendant cited diversity and matter in dispute exceeding $75,000 as jurisdiction of federal court. 131. On February 14, 2003, counterdefendants amended their Broward County complaint to say that the amount in dispute was less than $75,000, thereby denying federal diversity jurisdiction. 132. On that same day, counterdefendants filed a motion to remand Fort Lauderdale case #03-60195-CIV-MARRA/SELTZER to the Broward County Circuit Court. This motion was based on the amended complaint' "less than $75,000" phrase in spite of the fact that well-settled law says such post-remand amendments are not to be considered in remand decisions. 133. On March 31, 2003, counterdefendant WIN filed a third suit against counterplaintiff in Miami federal court (Case # 03-60597-CIV-SEITZ/BANDSTRA). The suit alleged defamation per se and claimed federal jurisdiction based on diversity and amount in dispute in excess of $75,000. As with the Broward County suit, the Miami suit could have and should have been an amendment to the then existing Fort Myers complaint or the Fort Lauderdale complaint. The suit was filed in Miami to harass and intimidate the California-resident pro se counterplaintiff. 134. On April 2, 2003 counterplaintiffsupplemented his opposition to counterdefendants" remand motion to inform the Fort Lauderdale Court that counterdefendants had filed a related suit claiming diversity jurisdiction in federal court in Miami. Pertinent law required the Fort Lauderdale Court to combine all three related lawsuits for the purpose of ascertaining whether the $75,000 threshold has been reached. 135. Counterdefendants initially sought remand and opposed consolidation of the various suits. Then they withdrew their remand motion and opposition to consolidation. Counterdefendants" filing of repetitive lawsuits in three different courts as well and repeatedly taking, then abandoning, positions is opposition to counterplaintiff' motions and notices demonstrate a willful effort to use legal process to for the improper purpose of harassing and intimidating counterplaintiff. COUNT V"”TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 136. This is an action for relief under the common law of tortious interference with a business relationship. 137. This court has jurisdiction over this action under the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction. This action is logically related to the defamation per se and tortious interference with a business relationship claims filed by WIN and WHITNEY against REED in that the tortiously interfering letters described below sent by counterdefendants cite the WIN/WHITNEY suits against REED. 138. On March 11, 2003, counterdefendants" attorney Scott Rothstein sent a letter (Exhibit A) to Verio Inc., the Internet company that hosts counterplaintiff' Web site. That letter acknowledged that counterdefendants knew that counterplaintiff had a business relationship with Verio, Inc. In that letter, counterdefendants maliciously, intentionally, unlawfully, and without justification interfered with that relationship in that they made false statements in order to persuade Verio, Inc. to restrict access to counterplaintiff' Web site and/or to end their relationship with counterplaintiff because of his alleged violations of Verio' written policies. As a result of that interference, counterplaintiff was damaged by having to devote time and energy to repairing his relationship with Verio. 139. On February 2, 2004, counterdefendants" attorneys sent a cease-and-desist letter (Exhibit B) to BayHouse LLC, a company that operates a Web site that contained a link to counterplaintiff ' Web site. The cease-and-desist letter acknowledged that BayHouse, LLC had a business relationship with counterplaintiff as manifested by the link from their Web site to counterplaintiff '. In that letter, counterdefendants intentionally, unlawfully, and without justification interfered with that relationship in that they made false statements in order to persuade BayHouse LLC to remove their link to counterplaintiff ' Web site. Upon information and belief, similar letters were sent to other individuals and companies who link with counterplaintiff ' Web site. Upon information and belief, as a result of that interference, counterplaintiff was damaged by having fewer links to his Web site and therefore fewer prospective readers referred to his Web site. Wherefore, defendant requests that: 1. Plaintiff take nothing on plaintiffs" claims; 2. Defendant have judgment against plaintiffs; 3. Defendant be awarded costs; 4. The Court grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper. Wherefore, counterplaintiff requests that: 5. This Court will adjudge that the marks johntreed and johntreed.com have been infringed as a direct and proximate result of the acts of counterdefendants as set forth in this counterclaim, in violation of counterplaintiff' rights under the Anticybersquatter Consumer Protection Act, 15 USC 1125(d); the Lanham Act, 15 USC 1125(a); and the common law, and that such infringement amounts to willful use by counterdefendants of counterplaintiff' marks. 6. This Court will adjudge that counterdefendants have competed unfairly with counterplaintiffs as set forth in this counterclaim, in violation of counterplaintiff' rights under the Anticybersquatter Consumer Protection Act, 15 USC 1125(d); the Lanham Act, 15 USC 1125(a); and the common law. 7. This Court will permanently enjoin and restrain counterdefendants, their officers, directors, agents, servants, employees, affiliates, attorneys, successors, and assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation therewith, from using the marks johntreed and johntreed.com in any domain name. 8. This Court direct counterdefendants to file with this Court and to serve upon counterplaintiff within 30 days after service of the injunction issued in this action, a written report under oath, setting forth in detail the manner of counterdefendants" compliance. 9. Counterplaintiff have judgment against counterdefendants including treble damages where permitted along with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; 10. Counterplaintiff be awarded costs; 11. The Court grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper. Respectfully submitted, March 18, 2004 ___________________________ John T. Reed, Pro Se Defendant 342 Bryan Drive Alamo, CA 94507 Telephone: 925-820-6292 Fax: 925-820-1259 www.johntreed.com John T. Reed, a.k.a. John Reed, Jack Reed, 342 Bryan Drive, Alamo, CA 94507, Voice: 925-820-7262, Fax: 925-820-1259, www.johntreed.com

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